1999 Olympic Pipeline Failure in Bellingham, Washington

Reference (many more details here): http://ops.dot.gov/bellingham1/faq.htm

The following info comes from a reader of Risks-L ( web version at http://catless.ncl.ac.uk/Risks/22.40.html):

Subject: Re: Computer problem caused fatal pipeline rupture (RISKS-22.36)

It is ingenuous to suggest that the Bellingham, Washington pipeline rupture was a result of a computer/software fault. The NTSB accident report clearly attributes the failure to a combination of quality assurance lapses and operational errors.

Although some of these are related to the SCADA environment, they are strongly overshadowed by:

• multiple errors in the configuration and installation of a pressure relief valve upstream from the rupture,
• physical damage by excavators to the pipeline during construction work, and
• failure of the pipeline operator to act on inspection reports suggesting damage in the vicinity of the construction area.

The report states that had the pipeline not been damaged, the pressure surge allowed even by the faulty relief valve would most likely not have resulted in a rupture.

In this case, it seems that process-wide safety controls were in place and would have protected the pipeline from failure if the human factors of management and operational procedures had connected the reported system anomalies with a potential failure.

A classic combination of multiple independent failures occurring within sufficiently close proximity where any single event would not have compromised the overall system integrity.

Regulatory bodies will rightly bring up this incident when organisations involved in hazardous operations complain about the level of regulatory compliance procedures to which they are required to comply. Received on Wed Nov 27 05:04:00 2002