The Hazards of Pressure Testing

Total Fina Elf

<<During hydrotesting and pressure testing operations incidents sometimes happen. This Safety Feedback Notice provides some typical examples which can be used as an aid in highlighting the hazards and dangers involved are what are often seen as routine operations.>>

10 Myths About Industrial Fire Protection

Plant Engineering Magazine

REGISTRATION REQUIRED

<<Most fire protection engineers would agree that there are many misconceptions about fire damage and suppression equipment. While no amount of fire protection can guarantee absolute immunity, a careful analysis of hazards, combined with the proper selection of fire protection systems, can drastically reduce potential damage.>>

Design of Pressure Relief Systems

Trang Nguyen (University of Waterloo ChE)

<<Determining the relief required is the most difficult part in designing a relief valve. To ensure the safety of the system, conservative assumptions and detailed analysis are applied. Refer to design considerations for more detail. It is assumed that two unrelated emergencies cost by two non-related equipment failures will not occur simultaneously. The design engineer needs to be familiarized with the overall process design. The design of the relieving device must take into consideration of many upset conditions for the individual equipment items, in precaution that these upsets may occur.>>

Pipeline Frequently Asked Questions

Office of Pipeline Safety

<<Our analysis indicates a pipeline using line pipe of proper design and construction, withstanding a successful hydrostatic pressure test, maintaining adequate cathodic protection, and protected from outside force damage is capable of performing safely for well over 100 years and possibly indefinitely. Some of the causes of pipeline failure and preventive actions by the Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS) are listed below.>>

Protect Plants Against Overpressure

Chemical Engineering

<<In a petroleum refinery or chemical plant, vigorous effort is required to avoid overpressure-related equipment ruptures. Such failures happen when the internal pressure of a vessel exceeds its maximum allowable working pressure (MAWP), often from a buildup of heat or materials. Ruptures of vessels, pipelines, seals and connections, can lead to fire and explosion, and the loss of liquids and vapors, all of which threaten workers' safety and the environment. Designing a pressure-relief system to protect vessels and equipment is tricky. Follow these tips to get the job done right.>>

Beware the Energy During Hydrotest

Australian Pipeline Industry Association

<<The integrity of a pipeline must be determined by a hydrotest. The energy content of high-pressure air or water or a mixture of both has the potential to do massive damage. Successful hydrotesting requires a commitment from owner, constructor, operator and engineering organisations to manage the hazards and reduce the risks. There must be an approach that identifies the hazards and sets standards for safe procedures on all projects. Work practices are available and should be used to eliminate hydrotest related incidents.The following guidelines should be considered in the project planning, preparation and execution of the hydrotest.>>

Approaches to Chemical Safety Management in the Chemical Industry

Stan Grossel, Process Safety & Design, Inc.

<<Types of hazardous liquids, relevant regulations, codes, and standards, storage of hazardous liquids.>>

Petroleum Refining Processes

OSHA Technical Manual

<<Introduction, Overview of the Petroleum Industry, Petroleum Refining Operations, Description of Petroleum Refining Processes and Related Health and Safety Considerations, Other Refinery Operations, Bibliography. This chapter of the technical manual covers the history of refinery processing, characteristics of crude oil, hydrocarbon types and chemistry, and major refinery products and by-products. It presents information on technology as normally practiced in present operations. It describes the more common refinery processes and includes relevant safety and health information. Additional information covers refinery utilities and miscellaneous supporting activities related to hydrocarbon processing. Field personnel will learn what to expect in various facilities regarding typical materials and process methods, equipment, potential hazards, and exposures. >>

Pressure and Deliverability Testing Oil and Gas Wells

Alberta Energy and Utilities board

<<Well test information is second only to production data in importance for the prudent management of oil or gas reservoirs. As such, well testing is an integral part of the overall production and depletion strategy of a reservoir. The lowest costs and the most benefit are realized when an adequate number of high quality tests are run throughout the producing life of the reservoir. >>

Gas Cylinder Safety

Denison University

Well Testing: Minimum Guidelines For Safety Enhanced Field Operations

Petroleum Services Association of Canada

<<In February 1987, at the request of concerned well testing companies and Alberta Occupational Health and Safety, a general meeting of all well testing companies and interested oil companies was held. Out of this meeting a committee was formed to prepare minimum guidelines for "Safety Enhanced Field Operations" as they pertain to well testing. Since the first publication of the guidelines, the Well Testing Committee of the Petroleum Services Association of Canada has assumed responsibility for keeping the guidelines current and for liaising with other interested groups. >>

Risk Management of a Petroleum Refining Facility

Risk Management Professionals, Inc.

<<This paper discusses the application of state-of-the-art fault tree analysis techniques to a refining facility that produces diesel fuel from a crude oil stream. This fault tree analysis was used to identify the failure sequences which could lead to process hazards, and the analysts used these results to evaluate the impact of specific hazards on process safety. Through recommendations presented in the study, the facility owner gained an increased awareness of potential problems and made modifications to reduce the possibility of a hazardous condition and subsequent catastrophic failure.>>

Chemical Exposures from Industrial Valve and Piping Systems

Saftek, Inc.

<<The purpose of this Hazard Information Bulletin is to heighten public awareness of the potential for death, physical injury, and/or illness resulting from the unexpected release of chemicals during refinery and other chemical process operations.>>

Control of Fugitive Emission Losses

Chemical and Process Engineering Centre, Singapore

<<Fugitive emissions are "leaks" or "releases" that occur whenever there are discontinuities in the solid barrier that maintains containment. Sources of fugitive emissions include pumps and compressors, storage and processing vessels, loading facilities, flow control and pressure relief valves, and leakage from pipelines carrying materials from one process to another. Fugitive emissions are usually small in quantities but are the origin of the continuous background exposure of workers. This paper provides some examples of engineering measures and technological innovations to control and abate the common sources of fugitive emissions from chemical processing plants, petrochemical complex and refineries. Due to the extent and complexity of the chemical and petroleum industries, enumeration of sources of fugitive emissions would require detailed analysis of individual process unit operations. It is beyond the intent of this paper to discuss in detail all sources of emissions and potential engineering control applicable to these emissions.>>

Representing Knowledge Requirements For The Operation Of Safety-Critical Interfaces

Glasgow Accident Analysis Group

<<Human intervention has played a critical role in the causes of many major accidents. The staff of the London Underground continued to allow trains to deposit passengers in Kings' Cross after the fire had started. The crew of the Herald of Free Enterprise set to sea with their bow doors open. The staff at the Bhopal chemical plant pumped Methyl-isocyanate into a leaking tank. Many of these accidents occurred because users did not understand the operating rules, or competency criteria, that were intended to preserve the safety of their application. This point has been reiterated in the accident reports that document these failures; staff and management lacked the necessary training to ensure the safety of their application. Unfortunately, there are few techniques that designers can use to reason about competency criteria for complex, interactive systems. The following pages address this problem and argue that epistemic logics can be recruited to represent knowledge requirements for safety-critical interfaces. These requirements form an important component of the training that is intended to determine whether users are competent to operate safety-critical systems. The application of a formal notation is appropriate because a range of organisations, including the UK Ministry of Defence and NASA, are advocating these languages for large-scale, development projects.>>

Ontario Fire Code: Piping and Transfer Systems

Government of Ontario, Office of the Fire Marshall

Fire and Water 1997 - What are the Main Issues?

National Fire Sprinkler Association

sci.engr FAQ on Failures

Learn From Others' Experience

Calculating Accidental Release Flow Rates From Pressurized Gas Systems

Milton R. Beychok

<<The purpose of this article is to present and explain two published source-term models for calculating the time-dependent decrease in pressure, temperature and weight of gas in a pressurized gas system or vessel during an accidental release.>>

Pipeline Safety

E.Mattei E.N.I.Foundation

Rupture Disk FAQ BS&B Safety Systems

Flare Research Project

University of Alberta Department of Mechanical Engineering

Christian Michelsen Research AS

Gas Explosion Handbook

<<The purpose of this handbook is to give a brief introduction to gas explosion safety, based on our current knowledge of the subject and on our experience in applying this knowledge to practical problems in the industry. Because of the intended brevity and simplicity of the handbook the information provided may in some cases be strongly simplified and/or incomplete. For in-depth information on the various subjects the reader is referred to the literature described in the References . The user of this handbook is intended to be a process- , design- or structural engineer, but the handbook should also be useful for safety engineers. Today there is a lot of information available in scientific papers and reports on gas explosions. However, in most cases the practical implications of this information are very hard to extract. A need for a handbook with simpler presentation of the available information that can be used in the industry, has therefore been identified. This handbook summarises the main results and experience from our previous research programmes and consultancy activity on gas explosion safety (Bakke et al., 1991). We are focusing on pressure build-up during gas explosions. Important areas of gas explosion safety, such as how to prevent leaks and what is the ignition probability, are not covered. In this handbook we assume that the premixed combustible gas has been generated and ignited. Phenomena of flame propagation and pressure build-up are discussed. The important factors influencing pressure build-up are pointed out and some simple guidelines are presented. The use of numerical codes (FLACS and µFlacs) for simulation of gas explosions in industrial environments is also covered.>>

ABSA

Alberta Boilers Safety Association

Intrinsic Safety

Omega Engineering, Inc.

<<Intrinsically safe equipment is defined as "equipment and wiring which is incapable of releasing sufficient electrical or thermal energy under normal or abnormal conditions to cause ignition of a specific hazardous atmospheric mixture in its most easily ignited concentration." (ISA-RP12.6) This is achieved by limiting the amount of power available to the electrical equipment in the hazardous area to a level below that which will ignite the gases. In order to have a fire or explosion, fuel, oxygen and a source of ignition must be present. An intrinsically safe system assumes the fuel and oxygen is present in the atmosphere, but the system is designed so the electrical energy or thermal energy of a particular instrument loop can never be great enough to cause ignition.>>